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ABSTRACT
A main objective of European governments is to reduce the number of early retirees, either by 
reforming pension systems or promoting active aging in working life.  The importance of formulating 
a coherent personnel policy for all age groups is increasingly recognized by employers. However, 
there is still a lack of knowledge as how to strategically cope with an aging labor force.  The aim 
of this article is to define and discuss a number of challenges arising from workplace-related 
active aging policies. We in particular discuss how an emphasis on economic incentives and 
gains (“senior goods”) may give rise to unanticipated side effects for the employers as well as 
the employees.  The article is based on results from two recent studies: one study examining six  
Norwegian municipalities with seemingly good practices in work-related old age policies, and an-
other examining such policies in eight establishments in four different industries. 
KEY WORDS
Active aging policy / case studies / early retirement / pro-retention programs / older workers / 
work place measures
Background 
The future of older workers has become an issue of major concern to European gov-ernments (OECD, 2013; 2006). To fulfill future demand for labor and to ensure that there is a large enough workforce to carry tomorrow’s pensions and public services, 
it is important to keep older workers in employment for longer. 
Internationally, researchers have long been concerned with active aging policies and 
practices, and several studies have been published under the auspices of EU (cf. Walker, 
1997; Taylor, 2006), European trade Union Institute (ETUI) (Jepsen et al., 2002), and 
OECD (OECD, 2006, 2013). The focus so far has generally been on employers’ at-
titudes toward older workers, age discrimination, and the need for attitude campaigns 
and lifelong learning. One exception is Finland, where the research has focused on the 
importance of employees’ working capacity and good working environment (see, e.g., 
Ilmarinen & Louhevaara eds., 1999; Sterdyniak, 2007). 
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Although the importance of formulating a coherent personnel policy for all age 
groups is increasingly recognized by employers, there is a lack of knowledge as how to 
strategically cope with an aging labor force (cf. Ennals & Salomon, 2011; Loretto et al., 
2009; Phillipson & Smith, 2005; Taylor, 2006). 
In two recent projects, we studied six Norwegian local governments and six public 
and private establishments with seemingly good merits in terms of work-related active 
aging policies and practices (Bogen & Hilsen, 2013; Bogen & Midtsundstad, 2007; 
Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011a). One of our aims was to clarify some of the choices and 
dilemmas that employers and local trade union leaders experienced as they formulated 
and implemented active aging policies. In particular, we wanted to investigate whether 
an emphasis on economic incentives gives rise to unanticipated side effects for employers 
as well as employees. We ask: Faced with different types of active ageing policy measures 
at the workplace level, which initiatives are chosen – and why? 
Before presenting our findings, we briefly describe the Norwegian welfare and la-
bor market context. Thereafter, we clarify what we mean by work-related active aging 
policies, and categorize different types of management initiatives aimed at strengthening 
the role of older workers. We also summarize earlier studies and findings and relevant 
theories to throw light on our research questions and findings.
The Norwegian context
In the autumn 2001, the Norwegian government and the social partners signed a tripar-
tite agreement for a more Inclusive Working Life (the IW-agreement) aiming at reducing 
the number of workers leaving the labor market due to early retirement.1 The agreement 
attempted to redefine the responsibilities of the state, the employers, and the employees. 
It called for greater social responsibility by employers in order to reduce early retire-
ment rates. All Norwegian enterprises (public and private) are encouraged to sign up as 
Inclusive Working Life enterprises on a voluntary basis. To become an IW-enterprise, the 
enterprise must sign an agreement with the local trade union and a representative from 
the state. This earns them certain comparative advantages in terms of state advice and 
financial support, though mainly advisory support.2 
The Tripartite Agreement rests on the assumption that part of the solution to 
the problem of early retirement and labor market exclusion is to be found at the 
workplace level. However, the IW-agreement only offers a framework for the social 
dialogue at the workplace. It is thus pertinent to ask what employers, local trade 
unions, and shop stewards actually do to combat early retirement and promote longer 
working careers.
The IW-agreement covers about 50 percent of the workforce (Ose et al., 2009). In 
particular, the municipalities have shown commitment to meet the challenges of early 
retirement (ibid.). This engagement is most likely linked to the serious labor shortage 
that are expected in the coming years, mainly driven by a growing number of teachers 
approaching retirement age, as well as an expected increase in the need for staff in the 
health and care sectors (NOU, 2010: 13). 
Policies aiming at keeping employees in work for longer are closely related to the 
early retirement schemes. Before 2011, old age pension in Norway under the National 
Statutory Insurance Scheme was not paid out prior to 67 years of age.3 The contractual 
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early retirement scheme (AFP scheme), however, provided about 80% of workers above 
the age of 62 the opportunity to take an early retirement (Midtsundstad, 2004). AFP 
was initially launched in 1989, and from 1998, it allowed workers to retire with full, or 
partial, pension from the age of 62. In the public (state and municipal) sector, the scheme 
covers all employees and in the private sector about 45% (ibid.). Before 2011, AFP-
benefits in the private sector equaled the old age pension received from the National 
Insurance Scheme at the age of 67, as well as a small contractual pension supplement. 
This is still the case in the public sector. However, between the age of 65 and 67, benefits 
in public sector are calculated in accordance with the occupational pension scheme. This 
has a guaranteed level ensuring all members with full qualification (30 years) a pension 
equivalent to two-thirds of their wage at the time of retirement (“gross arrangements”).4 
The AFP-scheme prior to 2011 weakened the economic incentives for employees to re-
main in employment after the age of 62, and still does so in the public sector. Employers 
also had some incentives to retain older workers as they partly or fully carry their own 
AFP-costs. The costs connected with employees retiring early through AFP were partly 
or fully born by the establishments until 2011 in the private sector.5 
Work-related old age policies
Different personnel policy measures may be employed to increase recruitment and em-
ployment and enhance the retention of older workers. In this article, we study programs 
for the prevention of early retirement and retention of older workers in the workplace, 
and not recruitment policies as such. Prevention programs encompass long-term efforts 
aimed at ensuring that employees do not end up in a vulnerable situation. These initia-
tives converge to what may be called sustainable personnel policies and aims at prevent-
ing health injuries or loss of work capacity, competence, and motivation. These policies 
do, in most cases, target all employees, and not older workers exclusively (e.g., those 
above 62 years of age). Retention schemes, in contrast, are directly targeting workers 
who already are in a vulnerable position or for other reasons (e.g., desire for more lei-
sure time) may wish to retire early. Initiatives for retention are directed toward defined 
target groups and particular situations. They are more often short term and narrow in 
scope compared with prevention programs (Midtsundstad, 2007). One example is how 
retention programs in Norway target employees around the age of 62, the age at which 
workers have the opportunity to retire early with AFP (and since 2011 also with old age 
pension from the National Insurance scheme). 
Another distinction can be made between measures directed at the individual em-
ployee, with the aim to maintain or increase workers ability and motivation to work, 
and measures directed at the workplace or workplace environment, with an aim to im-
prove working conditions for both individual employees and the workplace in general. 
In addition, some measures are traditional management tools that neither seek to change 
the individual nor the workplace. They include different types of welfare arrangements 
or benefits to facilitate a better work-life balance, as well as measures that aim to change 
the individual employee’s preferences between work and leisure (ibid.). 
In addition, we distinguish between measures offered to all employees over a certain 
age (universal or collective) and measures offered on the basis of individual assessment 
(means tested). 
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Previous research
According to Karppinen (2008), companies that introduce active aging policies do so to 
avoid labor and skill scarcity, retain valuable experience and skills, provide good return 
on investments in training, and enhance work satisfaction, which may contribute to im-
prove quality and productivity. The importance of these factors is supported by several 
other studies (cf. Cohen et al., 2009; Henkens, 2005; Midtsundstad, 2005, 2011; Taylor, 
2006; van Dalen, 2011, 2010a, 2010b; Walker, 1997). A study by Taylor (2006) exam-
ined more than 100 organizations in different EU countries (EU15) that had been long-
standing examples of good practice in old age management. This study found that in the 
period between mid-1990s and 2006, organizations started to approach old age policies 
in increasingly complex ways. There are several reasons for this development, but busi-
ness performance and efforts to maintain competitive advantages were important rea-
sons together with reducing costs, maintaining a skilled and competent workforce, and 
maintenance of labor supply in general. He also concluded that companies’ engagement 
in active aging policies and practices varied over the business cycle.
Some studies also discuss how lack of resources, both budgets and staff, make it 
difficult for managers to implement initiatives for older workers, such as shorter work-
ing hours, easier work tasks, or time off for learning and training (cf. Midtsundstad & 
Bogen, 2011a; Midtsundstad, 2011; Larsen & Miiller, 2006; Taylor, 2006). Although an 
enterprise may have adopted an active aging policy, middle managers often play a key 
role in implementing these policies (Furunes, 2008). However, relatively few managers 
reflect on the urgency of the aging challenge (Taylor, 2006; van Dalen et al., 2011). Some 
studies on stereotypical attitudes toward older workers have suggested that employers 
are becoming more positive toward this age group (Solem 2008); however, a consid-
erable proportion of managers still held negative and inaccurate stereotypes of older 
workers (Vickerstaff et al., 2009). 
The social partners have traditionally not been concerned with age discrimination. 
For many decades, European early retirement schemes were mainly developed in the 
context of economic restructuring, and seen as a way to end a working career in a digni-
fied manner. Although trade unions have often been ambiguous in questions related to 
aging, pursuing a mixture of strategies at different levels (Hutsebaut, 2003), they have 
often been caught in contradictions between micro and macro level strategies. It seems, 
however, that Norwegian and Nordic social partners are more aware of the problem of 
demographic change than partners in other European countries (Van Dalen et al., 2011). 
This awareness may have motivated them to react and take more actions, than other 
European countries. The strong ties between social partners and governments in the 
Nordic countries, that is, the Nordic model (cf. Dølvik, 2013; Hippe et al., 2007), may 
be a main reason for this. The “Nordic model” with its institutionalized cooperation be-
tween the social partners and a tradition for consensus is also an important background 
for understanding the implementation process of the IW-agreement at the local level, 
including the choice of different active aging measures.
Research has demonstrated that the likelihood of implementing workplace policies 
is linked to the attitudes of trade union leaders. A representative survey by Trygstad 
(2006) found that it was more common to adapt the workplace to individual needs, 
particularly for persons with a reduced working capacity, if trade union leaders had a 
positive stance on management-employee relations, and when employee involvement 
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was common. A study of 17 Norwegian manufacturing firms with old age management 
practices (Hertzberg & Skinnarland, 2007) also indicated that pro-retention programs 
and measures were more successful when based on a shared employer-employee dia-
logue as well as an active involvement from shop stewards, although such involvement 
was not common.
The IW-Agreement clearly signals a new direction in work-life policy, yet several 
studies indicate that attitudes at the local level have not changed significantly. According 
to Midtsundstad (2007), trade union leaders rarely were directly involved in designing 
their establishments’ age management policy and practice in (17% of all Norwegian 
enterprises), and only in a very small minority of enterprises (7% were the policies in-
cluded in local collective agreements). Midtsundstad (2005) also found that strong local 
relations between the social partners had no impact on companies’ willingness to retain 
older workers. 
This same pattern has been found in qualitative studies (Hilsen & Steinum, 2006; 
Olsen & Vangstad, 2004). Trade union leaders interviewed found it difficult to influence 
the employer-employee dialogue, and as long as management behaved “decently,” they 
saw no need to intervene. Trade union leaders defined their role as that of a watchdog, 
and not as a proactive instigator or a developer of new policies. The researchers conclud-
ed that as long as there was no fundamental conflict of interests, no lack of mutual trust 
between management and employees, or no significant changes proposed, trade union 
leaders were happy to leave questions of policy development to the management. Also, 
Danish research reports that union leaders frequently are unenthusiastic to initiatives to 
combat exclusion and to promote a more inclusive work place (Hohnen, 2002). 
Relatively few age management systems and pro-retention programs are properly 
evaluated, and consequently most retention programs and measures in use are deduced 
from research studying the causes of early retirement, that is, the importance of different 
pull and push factors, the causes of age-related changes in work ability, and age stereo-
types and ageism. The most common measures in use to combat early retirement, accord-
ing to Taylor (2006), are training and career development, followed by flexible working 
hours, both increasing with length of service. Additionally, measures to promote health 
and general well-being, long-established priorities in the Nordic countries, particularly 
in Finland, also have become a growing focus in most EU countries, although in contrast 
there is now less focus on the recruitment of older workers (ibid.). 
In Norway, the picture is somewhat different. In 2005, 60% of all Norwegian es-
tablishments had introduced measures to enable persons with a reduced working ca-
pacity to continue in employment; 40% reported to have programs preventing health 
problems and improving work ability, whereas 34% of the establishments promoted 
training, life-long learning, and career development for older employees past the age 
of 55 (Midtsundstad, 2007). Similarly, 31% reported to have pro-retention programs 
for older employees above the age of 62 (ibid.). I 2010 the picture was more or less 
unchanged (Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011a). 
The most common initiatives offered to retain older workers in Norway are less 
strenuous work, rearrangement of work tasks, shorter working hours without a propor-
tionate wage reduction, and provision of additional bonuses (ibid.). This was found to 
be the case in both 2005 and in 2010. However, we lack knowledge on how managers 
decide between different initiatives and measures, which programs and measures are the 
most commonly used, and why. 
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Data and methodology
We conducted case studies in six6 Norwegian municipalities7 in 2006–2007 (Bogen & 
Midtsundstad, 2007) and in 2012 (Bogen & Hilsen, 2013), covering in particular care 
work and teaching professions. In addition, we carried out case studies in eight differ-
ent public and private establishments8 in the period between 2009 and 2010, covering 
different types of work activities and professions: low/semi-skilled industrial work, care 
work, high skilled engineering work, and executive officers’ work in mi nistries or direc-
torates (Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011a). 
Our first sampling criterion was to include municipalities and establishments 
that had implemented an old age policy and introduced specific measures to prevent 
early retirement. A second criterion was that this policy had been running for some 
years in order to secure that it was well established in the enterprise. When sam-
pling municipalities and firms, we had no knowledge of any possible effects of the 
old age policies that had been implemented. We also lacked a register of enterprises 
that had implemented an old age policy, so we consulted experts within the nation-
al organization of municipalities (KS), The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 
(NHO), the main employer organization (LO), and the Norwegian Labour and Wel-
fare Organisation (NAV) in the sampling process. Through the two projects, we man-
aged to sample 129 different cases of establishments with a work-related old age 
policy. 
In each establishment, we interviewed the personal manager, one to two middle 
managers, and and one to three trade union leaders. In addition, we had individual 
interviews with a sample of five to eight older employees and early retirees above 
the age of 58 in each establishment, who were either a) about to take the decision 
whether to retire or not, b) who had recently retired, or c) had continued working 
beyond the early retirement age (which is 62 years in Norway for most employees). 
We used semi-structured interviews and special interview guides for managers, trade 
union leaders, and older employees and early retirees, respectively.10 All interviews 
were transcribed.
This article is mainly based on data from interviews with managers and trade union 
leaders. In the presentation of findings, we focus on the types of measures offered and 
the programs established. We look especially at the characteristics of the chosen mea-
sures, and the reasoning behind selecting them. The latter will be discussed in more de-
tail in order to identify reasons for why existing work-related old age policies in Norway 
do not seem to affect retirement behavior in the expected way, as some analyses indicate 
(i.e., Midtsundstad et al., 2012a, 2012b).
As our research design is based on case studies, our findings are not generalizable 
to all Norwegian establishments. However, our main purpose here is to investigate 
why these specific measures were selected, and what experiences enterprises thought 
to be in the forefront on old age policy had gained. Which possibilities and challenges 
are employers, trade union leaders, and employees facing when attempting to establish 
successful work-related old age policies? By scrutinizing municipalities and private 
firms that already had implemented an old age policy and introduced specific measures 
to prevent early retirement, we aim to reveal mechanisms that have a broader bearing 
beyond the specific units studied. We also discuss our findings in the light of earlier 
research.
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Results from the case studies
Reasons for early retirement vary both between individual employees and between dif-
ferent types of enterprises. A reasonable assumption is therefore that precautions taken 
at the enterprise level to avoid early retirement would vary accordingly. However, we 
found little such variation. All 12 establishments11 had a set of different measures (see 
Tab. 1), but they all offered some sort of financial compensation or extra time off as 
measures to reduce early retirement. These measures were in most cases given to all em-
ployees above a specific age (usually 62 years) and were viewed by most middle manag-
ers and employees as an individual right.
Table I An overview of the measures offered in the different establishments studied 
Case Employees Active aging  
measures from
Financial remuneration and 
reduced working hours1
Other measures 
Municipality 1 2800 2003 Employees who continue work-
ing after the age of 62 can select: 
a reduction of hours worked 
(20%) without a parallel wage 
reduction, or up to NOK 25 000 
for various adaptive measures 
(i.e., extra days off, no or less 
weekend work).
For all employees: performance 
appraisals (annual), possibility 
to a change in shifts, encour-
age career shifts, and lifelong 
learning.
Municipality 2 2000 2002 Employees who continue work-
ing after the age of 62 can select: 
a wage increase (NOK 12 000); 
reduced working hours without 
a parallel wage reduction (i.e., 10 
extra days off from age 62, 10% 
reduction in hours worked from 
age 63 and 20%  from age 64), 
or NOK 12 000 per year for 
various adaptive measures. 
Basic computer training from 
the age of 55, and performance 
appraisal at age 58 (manda-
tory).  
Municipality 3 1200 2001 Employees who continue 
working after the age of 62 get 
an annual bonus (NOK 12 000) 
up to the age of 65, or NOK 
10 000 per year for various 
adaptive measures (mainly for 
extra leave).
Municipality 4 1500 2001 Employees who continue work-
ing after the age of 62 can select: 
reduced working hours without 
a wage reduction (90/100), an 
annual bonus (NOK 12 000), a 
wage increase of NOK 12 000 
(pensionable), or NOK 10 000 
per year to pay for various adap-
tive measures.
Performance appraisal bi-
annually from the age of 55 and 
annual grants for special welfare 
measures (collective).
to be continued
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Case Employees Active aging  
measures from
Financial remuneration and 
reduced working hours1
Other measures 
Municipality 5 2300 20032 Employees who continue 
working after the age of 62 can 
select: reduced working hours 
(10%) without a parallel wage 
reduction, an annual bonus of 
NOK 15 000 (up to the age of 
65), or an annual wage increase 
of NOK 2500 (pension-
able).  They can also get up 
to NOK 10 000 per year for 
various adaptive measures.
Seminars for all older workers 
at age 60, management course 
in active aging, promotion of 
late life career planning at age 
45+, and measures to promote 
lifelong learning.
Municipality 6 800 2001 Employees who continue 
working after the age of  
62 can select: reduced  
working hours without a  
parallel wage reduction 
(90/100), or a wage increase 
(individual negotiations).
Performance appraisal for all 
older workers, promotion of 
lifelong learning for all past  
55 years of age, and various 
adaptive measures. 
Governmen-
tal sector  
(ministry)
Ca. 150 2005 All governmental employees 
past the age of 62 have (from 
2008) the right to 8 additional 
days of annual leave (regulated 
by collective agreements). In 
addition, the employees in this 
establishment get an additional 
6 days of annual leave from 
the same age (regulated by the 
local collective agreement). 
Those who to retire either fully 
or partly with AFP-pension 
have the opportunity to return 
to fulltime work after 1 year 
if they regret their decision. 
Those who need it may also 
change their ordinary work 
tasks.
Governmen-
tal sector 
(directorate)
Ca. 250 2005 All governmental employees 
past the age of 62 have (from 
2008) the right to 8 additional 
days of annual leave (regulated 
by collective agreements). In 
addition, the employees in this 
establishment get an additional 
6 days of annual leave from 
the same age (regulated by the 
local collective agreement).
The opportunity to give older 
employees with expert compe-
tence a wage increase, time off 
with or without compensation, 
reduced working hours over a 
shorter period, the possibility 
to work from home, and/or 
the possibility to join different 
courses and seminars. Top man-
agers also have the opportunity 
to shift from management to 
operative service, retaining 
their wage level. 
Private 
engineering 
firm (road 
construction)
1000 2005 Employees who continue 
working after the age of 62 
can get up to 6 weeks extra 
of annual leave off with full 
compensation.
to be continued
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 4  ❚  Number 2  ❚  May 2014 147
Private 
engineering 
firm (energy 
supply)
250 2006 Employees who continue 
working after the age of 62 can 
either select reduced working 
hours without a parallel wage 
reduction or get a special 
senior wage increase.
Special seminar arranged an-
nually for 55+s to encourage 
them to prolong their working 
careers (beyond 62 years). Man-
agers also have the opportunity 
to shift to an expert position. 
Top managers also have the 
opportunity to shift from man-
agement to operative service, 
retaining their wage level.
Private  
industry 
(process)
80 2005 Employees who continue 
working after the age of 62 get 
1 week additional annual leave. 
In addition, those who work 
the normal shift plan and have 
worked in the company for 
more than 25 years, or have 
pasted the age of 55, get an 
additional week annual leave 
(regulated in the local collective 
agreement).
Have changed the normal shift 
plan from four to three shifts.
Private  
industry 
(installation)
1150 2005 Employees who continue 
working after the age of 62 
can either select 10 extra days 
of annual leave or reduced 
working hours without a paral-
lel wage reduction (80/90 or 
90/100).
The possibility to combine par-
tial AFP-pension with part time 
work.3 Special performance 
appraisal for older workers, and 
special seminar to encourage 
older workers to prolong their 
working careers. 
1  The extra days or weeks of annual leave granted to older workers are awarded on top of the 5 weeks and 
1 day of annual leave, regulated by the Norwegian Holiday Act (§ 5). In addition many Norwegian employees have 
another 4 extra day days off, regulated by collective agreements (i.e. a total of 6 weeks). 
2  They started to work with active aging policy already in 1997.
3  The collective agreement only gives older worker the possibility, not the right, to draw a partial AFP-pension.
Previous surveys have found that among older workers in Norway bonuses, wage in-
creases and reductions in working hours are the most favored measures to prolong 
working careers (Hippe et al., 2012). Surveys also demonstrate that Norwegian leaders 
believe that economic incentives, like bonuses, and reduced working hours are the best 
measures to postpone early retirement (see, e.g., Furunes, 2008; Midtsundstad & Bogen, 
2011a; Midtsundstad, 2007). Our studies confirmed these findings. Both leaders and 
employees seemed to prefer economic measures and additional annual leave, as opposed 
to work adjustment measures. However, they stated different reasons for this prefer-
ence: leaders preferred these measures as they appeared less time-consuming for them, 
as they did not have to rearrange the organization of the work by adjusting work tasks. 
Employees preferred these measures because both extra money and extra leave appeared 
as more welcomed and neutral “goods” than work adjustments, and more in line with 
ordinary negotiated arrangements.
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The interviewed managers frequently recommended that old age measures were 
to be offered on the basis of an individual needs assessment, not as a universal good, 
distributed to all above a certain age. However, such assessments were rarely carried 
out. The main reasons seems to be that universal, rather than individual means tested 
measures more easily gained acceptance among employees and trade union leaders be-
cause it seemed fair, and among management because a distribution of measures accord-
ing to evaluation of individual needs could cause an unfavorable work climate. Hence, 
our case studies showed that most measures introduced were directed indiscriminately 
toward all employees above a certain age limit, not just at particular groups with an es-
pecially strenuous work situation or high risks for early retirement. Hence, the initiatives 
were based on an equal treatment philosophy. As a manager and a union leader put it:
“The measures we offer were not intended to be automatically distributed to all regardless of 
situation. But it is hard to find a good and just way to distribute them so in practice all above 
the age of 62 are entitled to our old age measures.” (leader in a public establishment 2012)
“It is hard to find an acceptable way to distribute measures when you differentiate mea-
sures between employees. What criteria should be used?” (union leader in a private estab-
lishment 2010)
We also noted that employees were usually allowed to decide themselves which mea-
sures to select even though leaders intended to have a say in this decision process. As 
one manager explained: 
“I think it is most fair that employees decide themselves what measures to select according 
to their own needs and private situation. Some may need the extra money because they 
have earned too little or have a modest pension, others may want more time off for differ-
ent reasons.” (manager in a private establishment 2010)
As mentioned, evaluation of individual needs and individually adjusted measures was 
often regarded as time-consuming by middle managers and would require both personal 
involvement and planning on behalf of the manager. As one manager put it: 
“It takes a lot of time to guide each person so that he or she can find what I as a leader 
think would be the appropriate measure for each person and too often we lack that extra 
time. And I don’t want to intrude too much into those persons’ private reasons for choos-
ing the way he or she does.” (manager in a public establishment 2010)
Hence, collectively held values about justice and fairness clearly prevailed between man-
gers, union leaders, and employees. We also experienced that the notions of justness and 
fairness were based on ideas of sameness, that is, the more equal the workload or work 
performance or benefits, the more it was regarded as just and fair. These norms seem to 
influence both the type of measure offered by the employer and, most of all, the way they 
were distributed, that is, offered by middle managers and actually selected by employees 
(Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011c). 
These values also seemed to include the younger generations of employees, as they 
rarely expressed criticism toward the senior arrangements. As an effect of a general trust 
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between generations in Norwegian working life, younger generations normally benefit 
from other types of “goods,” for example, connected to family life and bringing up chil-
dren. As one of our younger interviewees expressed it:
“Sooner or later we will be in the same situation as our older colleagues, needing special 
arrangements to prolong our working carrier.” (young union leader in a public establish-
ment 2010)
The older generations of employees, on the contrary, rarely expressed any concern about 
putting a heavier work load on to their younger colleagues in their selection of measures 
and this was not the reason for choosing financial remunerations and reduced working 
hours rather than work task adjustments. The selection of measures was to a larger ex-
tent a worry for mangers, as they would in the end be responsible for reorganizing the 
work process and find substitutes and suitable work task for those who were in need 
of adjustments. Besides, some of the younger employees may also have health problems 
and need adjustment.
In the following section, we will discuss more thoroughly some aspects and dilem-
mas characterizing the selected measures. We will also draw attention to some of the 
dilemmas of introducing active aging policies. 
Preferences of financial remuneration and reduced working hours
As previously mentioned, most of the establishments studied provided financial re-
muneration to employees who stayed in employment above the age of 62 (Tab. 1). 
Employees who receive financial remuneration (or any type of measures) as part of a 
work-related old age policy agree to stay in their job, for example, one additional year, 
as this is the precondition for receiving these measures. As such, the measures have an 
effect, although only to the extent that the employee was determined to retire. If not, 
one could say that the measures were superfluous as the employee was likely to stay in 
employment, regardless of any measures offered. 
The assumption behind the measures (e.g., increased pay, bonus, or severance pay) 
is that financial incentives motivate the employee to prolong her/his occupational career. 
However, this will only be true if it is lack of motivation that constitutes the problem, 
rather than bad working conditions, health problems, or reduced working ability. Stud-
ies have found that unmotivated employees prefer more positive attention from the em-
ployer rather than reduced working hours or increased pay to continue working (Hilsen 
& Steinum, 2006; Hilsen, 2009). Thus, if employers put more effort into convincing 
workers that they are both wanted and needed, they may motivate workers to postpone 
retirement. Such attitude changes are normally much less costly, not to say free, than 
increased pay and bonuses, but may require some engagement on behalf of the middle 
manager. On the contrary, generous schemes, offering bonuses, and reduced working 
hours without proportionate pay reduction may also in itself signal that the seniors are 
appreciated at the workplace. An older worker explained: 
“Extra money or reduced working hours is important for me since it signals that my leader 
still value what I am doing, especially the extra money since I reached the top of my pay 
scale long ago.” (older worker in public establishment 2009) 
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An important challenge concerning economic incentives is that they may prove paralyz-
ing, in the sense that employers do not have to take actions to deal with other causes of 
early retirement, for example, by creating a better and more inclusive working environ-
ment (preventive measures). 
Also, reduced working hours without a parallel pay reduction as a measure for 
postponing retirement may represent an economic incentive for employees, compared 
with a situation without compensation. However, a reduction in working hours may also 
be classified as a work adjustment measure, as it eases the workload and enhances the 
employee’s possibility to recover as working hours are reduced. It may then be preferred 
by employers and employees, not only because it represents an economic incentive but 
also because it promotes health and general well-being, without demanding adjustments 
of work tasks and extensive planning, apart from rearrangement of work schemes and, 
if necessary, a supply of substitutes. Compensated reduction of working hours may thus 
both be seen as an economic incentive and an easy way to change the work load. 
Many health and social sector employees seem to prefer financial remuneration 
to reduced working hours, despite the fact that, as noted, the latter more likely will 
improve their work situation, as they are then less exposed to strenuous working con-
ditions relative to the reduction of hours worked. The reason for choosing financial 
remuneration may be that they are low paid and/or have not yet acquired the 30 years 
in service required for entitlement to a full occupational pension benefit. Another reason, 
especially in the health and care sector, may be that most of the employees already have 
a part-time job, either because it is difficult to get a full-time job or because they have 
themselves chosen to work part time (Nergaard, 2010). However, some of the older 
nurses and nurse assistances interviewed claimed that they, if they were given the choice, 
would prefer less strenuous shifts (e.g., avoiding evening shifts followed by morning 
shifts) instead of bonuses and reduced working hours. This suggests that municipalities 
should more thoroughly examine the effects of various measures in light of the needs 
and actual work situations of different occupations and individuals.
The focus on economic incentives may also be related to lack of economic incentives 
on behalf of the employees in the AFP schemes in the public sector (and before 2011 in 
the private sector too), as they give the employees the same pension benefit whether they 
retired at the age of 62 or 66. Bonuses and wage increases will then compensate for this 
lack of economic incentives. 
It may also be the case that trade unions and union leaders prefer economic incen-
tives including reduced working hours without wage reduction, because they transfer 
their traditional concern with wages and working hours into new areas, such as old age 
policies. It may seem easier for shop stewards to demand wage increases, bonuses, and 
reduced working hours for all older workers (pasted 62), than to demand older work-
ers a right to individual, adjusted measures, which in each case will be evaluated by 
management. The same goes for control and follow up of measures that have already 
been agreed. As mentioned earlier, other studies have found that trade unions mostly got 
involved in issues covered by the collective agreement, such as wages and working time, 
including shift work (Hertzberg & Skinnarland, 2007).
Knowing that employees in other municipalities gain benefits like extra pay or re-
duced working hours without parallel wage reductions may also influence the trade 
unions to demand similar benefits at their own work place, as we found to be the case 
in some of the establishments studied. This spillover effect may also indicate that union 
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leaders to some degree have lost the focus on the original goal of counteracting early 
retirement. Instead, they focus on their main job, which is to struggle for more fringe 
benefits and social benefits for their members, which in this case are those above a cer-
tain age. 
Universal or targeted measures?
As noted, most establishments in our studies aim at integrating age management and 
measures into the general personnel strategy. This means that any individual assessment 
should be carried out jointly by the manager and the employee, to find the type of mea-
sures best suited for each employee. 
Most establishments in our studies pursued universal measures (cf. Tab. 1). All em-
ployees aged 62 or above were entitled to one or more measures, such as reduced work-
ing hours with full pay compensation, or pay increase/severance pay. Thus, measures 
distributed on the basis of individual needs were turned into common rights. In other 
words, employers too seem reluctant to discriminate between employees, as this would 
challenge a strong tradition of equal rights in Norwegian working life. One of the inter-
viewed leaders said:
“Our employees do not tolerate unequal treatment.” (manager in a private establishment 
2010) 
In spite of an intention to tailor means to individual needs, it is easier to grant everybody 
the same rights. Such equality of access to measures also has other advantages. It pre-
vents unfair treatment of employees and counteracts a deterioration of the internal work 
environment. But this principle of non-discrimination makes it on the contrary difficult 
to regard the measures as an integrated part of the employer’s personnel strategy. Thus, 
the employer may fail to actively abolish the causes of early retirement. Instead, mea-
sures are introduced, although no real commitment is made to tackle the causes behind 
why employees want to retire early. 
In addition, universal measures are practical and may, from the employee’s point of 
view, seem to be a fair strategy. It seems, however, that other measures would have been 
more suitable to some groups of employees, as the reasons for early retirement differ 
considerably between different groups of employees (cf. Bråthen & Bakken, 2013; Midt-
sundstad, 2002, 2012; Phillipson & Smith, 2005). Still, measures such as pay increase/
severance pay or a reduction in working time in return for full pay have broad support. 
Those are the measures preferred by most employees as they appear like an “offer you 
cannot refuse.” 
There are good arguments in favor of providing universal measures for all employ-
ees above a certain age. However, these universal arrangements may prove unneces-
sary costly, as they will be provided to employees who probably would have continued 
working even without any measures offered. The costs of providing universal measures 
may therefore, in particular if being generous exceed any potential cost-savings result-
ing from a reduction in early retirement. Counted in hours worked, the total number of 
hours reduced may exceed the number of hours gained by delayed retirement. This will 
particularly be the case in enterprises where few of the employees actually retired at the 
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age of 62 before any retention program was introduced. This was the case in some of the 
establishments we studied, especially the ministry and the directorate and the two engi-
neering firms. This outcome was also found in a study by Becken (2012) who evaluated 
the experiment with reduced working hours for older workers in some governmental 
sectors. It is thus important that the enterprises concerned have sufficient knowledge of 
and access to data displaying early retirement patterns and pension utilization within 
the organization, before they implement such measures, in order for them to estimate 
the actual costs and benefits connected with different measures. However, such data and 
cost estimations were generally missing in the enterprises we studied.
Access not only to retirement and pension data, but also to information on general 
economic performance, seems crucial. By our second visit to the six municipalities, 
the majority were, for different reasons, in deep economic hardship. Hence, several of 
the municipalities either abolished or wanted to abolish their most costly measures, 
such as bonuses and reduced working hours without parallel wage reductions. Some 
of the municipalities who wished to abolish these measures felt trapped, fearing the 
reaction from trade unions and employees. This is a real risk, as in a recent court case 
between a Norwegian municipality and the local trade union, the decision fell in favor 
of keeping these measures (Kommunal Rapport, 2013). This goes to show that taking 
something away from somebody often has a stronger motivational impact on their 
(here: employee’s) behavior than adding something (Kahneman, 2011). Thus, removing 
measures may generate an unanticipated and negative signal effect, and lead to disap-
pointment among older employees, who may feel that they are no longer appreciated 
by their employers.
Organizational constrains
In the case studies, we also found that considerations among colleagues in many cases 
were decisive to which measures the establishment decided to implement. In industrial 
sectors, with many parallel and dependent work processes, it also turned out to be par-
ticularly challenging to adapt work processes to individual needs. Such “tight” produc-
tion processes often lack alternative tasks, odd jobs, and flexible working arrangements. 
In work processes where job rotation is a normal procedure, reduction of workload for 
one or two may also increase the load for the remaining work team, jeopardizing the 
health of even more employees. One reason, mentioned by a trade union leader, was the 
lack of a part-time culture in the industrial sector; most employees wanted to work full 
time until the day they retired.
“Easier work tasks would have been more suitable for many older workers, than a few 
extra days off, but we do not have enough such jobs available. Furthermore, it has to be 
real tasks we offer them. It is little tolerance for ‘odd jobs.’” (manager in a private estab-
lishment 2010) 
In this establishment, we found that collective solutions (for all employees) rather than 
individual solutions were sought when trying to improve working conditions (changing 
the shift plan), because it was considered easier to both organize and achieve acceptance 
for such solutions among the remaining employees. The preference of collective solu-
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tions or measures, especially in male-dominated establishments, may also have a cultural 
explanation:
“Many workers find it difficult to talk about their needs for adjusted tasks and work. They 
do not want to talk about their health problems or difficulties.” (union leader in a private 
establishment 2010)
A Danish study, cited in Jørgensen et al. (2006), indicated some of the same pattern even 
for a sample of government agencies. This study emphasized that unless sufficient sub-
stitute labor is provided, the senior workers are less likely to take the offer of reduced 
working hours because their workload will just pile up, generating a heavier workload 
that have to be dealt with later. Alternatively, they fear negative reactions from their col-
leagues if their workload increases as a result. 
Power and resources at the appropriate level
Middle management knows individual employees better than top management. They 
have daily personnel responsibilities, and can therefore better judge the measures that 
may be most suitable for each individual, and also which measures that are possible to 
implement. In the establishments studied, middle managers were the ones that mostly 
mapped out the needs of older workers and suggest suitable measures.
However, some of the available measures proved difficult to implement. One reason 
was that funds were not set aside for substitute employees. For employees in two of 
the occupations studied, teachers, and care workers, absence from work was difficult 
without substitutes. Unlike administrative or technical employees, they were constantly 
in direct contact with end users such as pupils and nursing home residents. This is why 
funds for substitutes must be available if reduced working hours are to have the desired 
effects. The same conclusions emerge in other studies of senior policy practice at the 
enterprise level (cf. Larsen and Miiller, 2006). 
Furthermore, we found that savings due to reduced early retirement often went to 
the central part of the organization. If one local unit of the organization succeeded in 
reducing the retirement rate, savings were not allocated back to their unit of origin. This 
may reduce motivation among middle management and employees alike for retirement 
reduction than if the successful units were allowed to keep some of the savings. Some 
public establishments are contemplating the transfer of responsibility for the AFP to the 
local units, so that they themselves carry most of the costs of the scheme. Correspond-
ingly, they will also keep (parts of) the savings generated by a reduction in AFP-depar-
tures. This arrangement is expected to strengthen the support of old age policies within 
the organization, especially among middle management in the public sector. 
Conclusion
Work-related active aging policies in Norway are to a large extent characterized by a 
consensus between employers and employees on the measures offered. Furthermore, 
there is a focus on measures to retain workers who are entitled to early retirement 
benefits (age 62 and above), rather than measures to prevent early retirement in general 
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(OECD, 2013). As our case studies demonstrate, employers, as well as union leaders and 
employees, seem to prefer economic measures to prevent early retirement, like bonuses 
and reduction of working hours without a proportionate wage reduction, rather than 
measures to improve the working environment or increase the employees’ working abil-
ity. Measures are most frequently distributed universally, to all old employees, regardless 
of individual needs. Our findings also indicate that the presence of economic incentives 
often overshadow use of other, noneconomic, and adaptive measures.
One of the main reasons for early retirement among employees in Norway is health 
problems and heavy workloads (Midtsundstad, 2002, 2005, 2012). The shared accep-
tance of economic incentives may therefore explain the lacking effects of workplace-
related measures (Becken, 2012; Midtsundstad et al., 2012a, 2012b). Last, although the 
Norwegian IW-agreement recommends the use of individual mean tested measures to 
prevent early retirement, and also top managements seem to prefer them, most of the 
establishments fronting old age policies in Norway have chosen universal measures. 
The main reasons for selecting economic and universal, instead of means-tested 
and noneconomic measures, seem to be an uncritical imitation of other establish-
ments’ policies, strong collectively held values of sameness, and ‘equal rights for all’ 
in Norwegian working life, organizational constrains, and, to some extent, middle 
managers lack of time, resources, and economic incentives to prioritize individual 
needs assessments. 
Research has shown that the causes of early retirement are complex and are 
generated by a number of different factors within, as well as, outside the workplace 
(Midtsundstad, 2012). The various pull and push factors also vary in importance for 
different professions and educational groups (ibid.). One would therefore assume that in 
order to be effective, the initiatives and instruments launched to prevent early retirement 
need to vary between professions, industries, and sectors. In Norway today, however, 
they do not. The options and the allocation criteria are surprisingly similar across indus-
tries and enterprises, despite the heterogeneity of needs, problems, and challenges. This 
may be one reason why active aging policies and the measures chosen by Norwegian 
establishments are not necessarily effective in reducing early retirement.
In addition, the costs of the measures offered may exceed the intended gains, as 
those who would continue working anyway also are entitled to the senior measures. The 
same argument goes for labor supply, that is, whether there will be any additional hours 
worked or not, as many of those who would otherwise work full-time now choose to 
work part-time. 
An additional problem is that few of the establishments with an implemented old 
age policy have actually evaluated the effects of this policy on retirement behavior. This 
is mainly due to lack of necessary data and knowledge on how to carry out such evalua-
tions. An uncritical imitation of what is assumed to be good practice in terms of old age 
policies may then, at worst, lead to an unintended reproduction of ineffective and costly 
tools and measures. 
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End notes
  1  The parties to the IW-Agreement defined the following three objectives: (a) To reduce sick-
ness absence by at least 20% within 4 years, (b) to secure employment for a larger number 
of disabled people, and (c) to raise the de facto retirement age. This third objective is the 
subject of our investigation in this article. The state and the social partners have recently 
agreed upon a new agreement for the period 2010 until 2013.
  2  However, the government has few initiatives specially directed toward older workers, ex-
cept from an advisory service on old age policies. Actual old age policy measures must to 
a large degree be financed to a large degree by the firms themselves. 
  3  From 2011, we will have an arrangement with a flexible retirement age under the National 
Insurance Scheme from the age of 62; with the pension benefit being higher the longer one 
waits before drawing it. From the same age, a person may continue working and still draw 
a pension from the National Insurance Scheme, without the pension being affected.
  4  In addition, about 40% of local governmental employees have an age limit of 65 – for 
example, nurses, auxiliary nurses, home carers, cleaners, and drivers. According to the so-
called “85-years rule,” they are also allowed to leave their position up to 3 years before 
this age limit and get their occupational pension, if their age and years in public service in 
sum equals 85 years or more.
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  5  From 2004, employers in local governmental sector could also choose to opt out of a com-
mon redistribution system in which the collective carries the AFP-cost, and carry 50 or 
100% of the total costs of their own AFP-pensioners themselves.  
  6  In 2012, we had the possibility to revisit the six municipalities from the 2006/2007-study 
in order to see the outcomes of their old age policy, whether it had fulfilled its promises in 
reducing early retirement, and if not what obstacles they had met. At this last visit, we inter-
viewed the same type of informants as at the former visit. 
  7  Norway has 431 municipalities that differ on a wide range of conditions such as the size 
of the population (number of inhabitants), economic situation, demography, recruitment 
conditions, and so on. Within the governmental system, the municipalities are allowed 
self-determination on a wide number of questions.
  8  Two of these were also part of the former mention study. We chose to revisit these two 
since we then had the possibility to do a follow-up. In the 2009–2010 study, the number 
of new cases was thus six.
  9  Originally, there were 14 cases, but two of these “overlapped.”
10  The interview guides are documented in Midtsundstad & Bogen (2011) and Bogen & 
Midtsundstad (2007).
11 See earlier note.
